Very preliminary-please do not quote.
The recent surge in economic inequality in many parts of the world has focused attention on the super-wealthy. According to Forbes magazine, which tracks such things, the number of billionaires worldwide rose from 423 in 1996 to 1,826 in 2015. Their aggregate net worth increased from $1 trillion to $7.05 trillion, more than the combined GDP of Germany and the UK. Although this partly reflects inflation-$1 bn in 1996 had the purchasing power of $1.57 bn today-even adjusting for this, the growth of extreme wealth is remarkable. In constant 1996 dollars, the number of billionaires rose from 423 to 1,225, and their total wealth soared from $1 trillion to $4.48 trillion.
In Russia, high net worth individuals have attracted special interest since the 1990s, when a number of so-called "oligarchs" emerged amid the unruly transition from communism. In 1996, the Financial Times quoted one banker who claimed that he and six others controlled half the country's economy (Freeland, Thornhill, and Gowers 1996) . Such assertions were greatly inflated (Treisman 2011, pp.446-7) . Still, the perception of an unusual concentration of wealth stuck.
Under President Putin, first elected in 2000, such magnates are thought to have lost much of their political influence, if not their property. Some leading businessmen of the 1990s were forced into exile or jailed. However, others prospered. Some observers have noted a gradual redistribution of assets from billionaires associated with President Yeltsin to others with security service backgrounds or personal connections to President Putin (Treisman 2008 , Djankov 2015 3).
The goal of this paper is to glean what can be learned from the admittedly limited data available. How have the number and characteristics of Russia's billionaires changed over the last 15 years? What are the sources of their wealth? Does Russia's experience with billionaires resemble that of other countries, or is it distinctive to the postcommunist transition-or to Russia itself?
The main data used here come from the Forbes annual rankings of billionaires and their estimated net worth. These data have obvious weaknesses. They focus on large bloc holdings of shares and may miss diversified portfolios, not to mention wealth that is carefully concealed.
Forbes explicitly excludes government officials from its accounting. Still, as Thomas Picketty has argued, these data have "the merit of existing," and they have been found informative by authors of a number of previous studies (Picketty 2015, p.437; Bagchi and Svejnar 2015; Klass et al. 2006 Guriev and Rachinsky (2008) showed that neglecting the super-wealthy leads to considerable underestimation of postcommunist wealth and income inequality. Guriev (2010) mass above $1 billion, the larger the population, the more individuals in that part of the distribution.
Other characteristics follow from ideas about the wealth-generating process. If fortunes are created by disproportionate returns to "superstars," these returns should increase with the size of the market (Rosen 1981, pp.855-6) . Domestic market size is already captured by income per capita and population (which, multiplied together, equal GDP). To proxy for longer access to world markets, I
use This is built from mostly subjective expert ratings and surveys, but since a belief that property is insecure will depress accumulation, subjective perceptions are relevant. Finally, some claim that the fortunes of oligarchs in Russia and elsewhere reflect the vast rents associated with natural resources or the opportunities created by privatization schemes. The World Bank has compiled comprehensive data on the latter, although unfortunately only for low and middle income countries. Table 1 shows Poisson regressions of the number of billionaires in each country on these various factors (since the dependent variable is a count, Poisson rather than OLS regression is appropriate). The frequency of billionaires is most robustly associated with market size (high income, population, and stock market capitalization) and low top marginal income tax rates. Natural resource rents and rule of law are not statistically significant, while high real interest rates and more The answer turns out to be: yes. Beneath each model in Table 1 , I list the countries that have the largest excess of billionaires over the number predicted. Russia shows up-along with the US, Germany, India, and Hong Kong-in a club of countries that are particularly well endowed with billionaires. While most of the US excess is explained by the country's large stock market and moderate top tax rates (the US gap falls from 112 to 23 billionaires in column 2), Russia still has 42 more billionaires than predicted even taking into account its tax rate and stock market size. And since rule of law and natural resource rents are not statistically significant while more privatization is associated with fewer-not more-billionaires (columns 3 and 4), Russia's distinctiveness in these regards probably does not explain the excess. Results are generally similar-and Russia's even more anomalous-if we focus instead on the net wealth of countries' billionaires (Table A1) .
Thus, although the rises and falls in Russia's stock of billionaires follow the global pattern, by 2008 the number had surged to a level higher than one might have predicted. How did the country's leading businessmen get so rich? The stereotype has it that Russia's oligarchs are overwhelmingly concentrated in the oil sector. That was somewhat true of the first wave. The majority of the 27 billionaires as of 2005 had enriched themselves at least in part from oil, gas, coal, or oil refining (Table 2 ). Yet hydrocarbons were not the only path to wealth. Almost half had profited from Russia's metals industries, and almost one third had accumulated their wealth at least partly in finance. By 2015, the economic profiles of Russia's richest were far more diverse. Only 28 percent owed their wealth to hydrocarbons and 20 percent to metals. The most common route to riches had become finance. And a range of other sectors-from real estate to trade and information technology-had also produced billionaires. Russian group includes Yeltsin-era tycoons who were very publicly expropriated by the Putin administration. By contrast, the attrition rate for Russians who became billionaires since the global financial crisis has been much higher than those for other nationalities. Among Germans who became billionaires between 2011 and 2014, 97 percent were still billionaires in 2015. Among Russians, the corresponding figure was 43 percent. 
